Updated September 2021.
On a rainy Sunday afternoon on July 6, 2008, Rafael Nadal and Roger Federer walked onto Centre Court at the All England Club to compete for the Wimbledon title for the third consecutive year. Federer was the five-time defending champion and Nadal pushed him to five sets the previous year before losing the match. This time; however, Federer’s streak would end in what is widely considered the greatest tennis match ever played. Each player challenged the other to improve and the result was a remarkable demonstration of technical skill, athleticism and resolve. The partisanship between (some) fans dissolved. Spectators were united in admiration for both as they watched each man push the other to previously unseen heights. They were no longer Nadal or Federer fans, but fans of the sport. After nearly 5 hours of play– and two rain delays– the match ended in the dark of night with Nadal the champion. Journalist Chris Bowers concluded, “Nadal won the match, Federer lost it, and the whole of tennis, if not the whole of sport, won through the sheer quality and drama of one of the best pieces of sporting theater tennis has ever produced.”
The Space Race, which began in the mid-1950s, similarly captured the imagination of the international community. Through the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, two nations accomplished what had heretofore never been achieved via space exploration. Space was perceived as the “final frontier” and the Space Race was accompanied by a global sense of awe at human accomplishment. In 1969, the world collectively held its breath as Apollo 11 safely landed on the moon. Neil Armstrong’s famous quote when he stepped on the lunar surface significantly noted the importance of this achievement, not for America, but for “mankind.”
Innovation is often developed through competition. When the importance of these advancements is recognized, a sense of commodore may result when mutual appreciation for the undertaking erodes division. This byproduct of competition; however, rarely lasts. By the Australian Open final in 2009, Nadal and Federer fans were again divided. Eventually, Andy Murray, Stan Wawrinka and Novak Djokovic began to win Grand Slam titles, which dampened the dominance of Federer and Nadal and created more factions of fans. Similarly, the collective astonishment that accompanied the Space Race quickly dissipated. The Cold War persisted for another two decades and divided the globe between the Eastern and the Western Bloc. The entry of new space faring nations diluted Soviet and U.S. dominance in the realm and resulted in more states competing to utilize space. (Djokovic is China, obviously). As more nations send objects into outer space, the potential for a new contest has emerged. The race to enter space is over and– due to the proliferation of new technology and actors– the competition to control it has intensified.
Presently, there are thousands of satellites in space that provide worldwide communication, navigation services, weather forecasts and planetary surveillance. Militaries also heavily rely on these satellites, with U.S. dependence significantly greater than other nations. China and Russia initiated plans to counter U.S. dominance in the arena and have tested anti-satellite weapons. If a conflict in space occurred, it would “cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure” and existing international treaties can not adequately regulate the proliferation and potential use of space weapons.
The United States should lead an initiative to draft a treaty to regulate the weaponization of outer space. The objective of the treaty would be to resolve existing ambiguity related to space weapon use, and to maintain the peaceful exploration of space. The Russians, Chinese and Europeans proposed initiatives to combat the rising concern of a space arms race, but their propositions were poorly received. The United States should channel its competitiveness against other space faring nations– not to quickly weaponize space– but to innovate international law. Where the Russians, Chinese and Europeans failed to gather global consensus, the United States can push itself to find creative solutions, where comradery is not a temporary byproduct, but a lasting consequence. The race to control space should not result in the proliferation of space weaponry, but in the security of space and national assets in orbit.
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the first satellite to enter outer space. Prior to its launch, the legal landscape of outer space was uncertain. International law provided that nations were given sovereignty over airspace that extended above their territory. If this regulation applied to outer space; however, the launch of Sputnik would breach sovereignty rights of the nations below its flight path. Since the United States was also engaged in activities to launch objects into space, the Eisenhower Administration decided not to challenge Soviet action.[1] The beginning of the space race necessitated the drafting of international treaties to govern activity in outer space.
Agreements were quickly written and ratified to create order in space exploration. One year after Sputnik’s launch, the United Nations (UN) established an ad hoc group called the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS), which later became a formal part of the UN under Resolution 1472(XVI). One decade later, the most important legal framework to govern space activity was enacted: the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”). As of 2021, it has been ratified by 111 nations.[2] Fifty-four years after the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty, concerns about the weaponization of outer space persist.[3]
The weaponization of outer space is distinct from militarization. Militarization pertains to the use of space assets to assist conventional military functions, such as the deployment of military satellites and GPS systems, which already occurs. Conversely, the weaponization of space involves the placement of weapons in space or on celestial bodies, the manufacture of weapons that can be used from Earth to penetrate space, the building of weapons that will travel to space to destroy targets, and weapons that can attack earth from space.[4] “Ultimately, space weaponization is far more concerning than space militarization because it would potentially engender militarized disputes in space, imperiling the vast array of satellites necessary to maintain the modern, globalized world.”[5] Although every country could be adversely affected by a disruption of satellite communications, the consequences for the United States would be most devastating due to its disproportionately large reliance on space assets.[6] To better understand the consequences of a disruption of satellite communication, an examination of how satellites and space weapons operate is necessary.
Over the preceding 50 years, satellites were launched into Earth’s orbit to provide a variety of functions, which include telecommunication, time and location services. Satellites are primarily tracked through the radio signals they emit, and their functionality depend on the ability to receive and transmit information back to Earth.[7] The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is a “space-based positioning and navigation system designed to provide worldwide, all weather, passive, three-dimensional position, velocity and timing data.”[8] The system is used for navigation of airplanes, ships, trains, cars and satellites.
The geosynchronous orbit (GEO) is 22,300 miles above the Earth and is where satellites appear stationary. The orbit is optimal for communication, television, and radio satellites. General John Hyten, the former leader of U.S. Strategic Command stated, “that is where we do our special communications, from national command-and-control communications [to]… our nuclear business.”[9]
Due to the extensive use of these satellite and radio signals, international cooperation was necessary to regulate signal transmission and receipt. The mandate of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which already existed to monitor similar functions on Earth, expanded in the early 1960s to include space satellites. The ITU assigns positions and frequencies for satellites in GEO.[10]
Satellites in GEO are particularly vulnerable to attack. The routes they travel are known and the satellites can be disabled with relative ease. “A war in orbit could wreck the delicate satellite constellations that the world relies on for navigation, communication, scientific research and military surveillance.”[11] The ability to incapacitate an adversary’s satellite communications is considered a powerful military tool. Out of the 3,372 satellites in Earth’s orbit, 1,897 belong to the United States, 412 to China, and 176 to Russia.
Space may be weaponized in a variety of ways. Direct-energy weapons use a high concentration of energy focused on a target to cause damage. Kinetic-energy weapons are projected through space at a target. General Hyten is particularly concerned about damage caused by a kinetic attack because it would cause space debris, which would pose a grave risk to all satellites.[13] Nations can also use ground-based direct ascent missiles or lasers to destabilize or damage an enemy’s target. Additionally, an adversary may use a missile to place a payload into orbit that can attack a satellite, or use satellites to target a vital asset on Earth.[14] Enemy spacecraft may also get close enough to a satellite to damage its optics with paint, break an antenna, destabilize its orbit, or jam communication signals.[15]
Many spacecraft in Earth’s orbit are dual purpose, which renders the identification of potential weapons difficult. According to Michael Listner, founder of Space Law and Policy Solutions, “almost everything we put in space is dual-use- you can use it for a good or malignant purpose.”[16] The United States likely has the highest number of space weapons; however, dual use capabilities shields the United States, and other launching nations, from being forthright about space activities .[17] For example, NASA’s Robotic Refueling Mission is a project that refuels satellites, but it could be perceived as a weapons development mission. If fuel can be brought to a satellite, proximity can allow the refueling technology to move satellites, “eavesdrop on all [their] data, change their purpose, or grab and deorbit it.”[18] In China, the People’s Liberation Army Colonel Li Daguang recommended that the Chinese invest in dual-use technology in space because of the expense of building and maintaining space technology. When civil-use technology can also perform military functions, it is difficult to determine if a technology will be used for nefarious purposes.[19]
The United States’ large satellite presence is both an asset and liability. The U.S. transformed its war-fighting technology after the Cold War to be principally dependent on satellite support, and space-based ISR and communication connectivity.[20] An attack on our satellites would devastate military and civilian infrastructure. From a defensive standpoint, the extensive U.S. presence is an advantage. Unlike China, the United States has allies in space that can host part of its global sensor network. The Chinese are relatively isolated and are primarily limited to observations over East Asia. Some former Soviet and Eastern European allies may allow Russia to extend their view, but it is not as comprehensive as the United States’.[21]
China
Twelve years ago, the Chinese tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) on an old weather satellite. The test exposed the vulnerability of many space assets and created space debris that will remain in orbit for decades– with some particles lasting for centuries.[22] In 2014, a Chinese satellite called Shijan 15 achieved high-speed propulsion abilities and intercepted the Chinese satellite Shijan 7. The Chinese government acknowledged that Shijan 15 had a robotic arm, and stated that the satellite was used for space debris observation.[23] Max White, a member of the Kettering group of astronomers, concedes Shijan 15 may not be used for military purposes despite its ability to disable adversary satellites.[24]
In early 2017, General Hyten stated that the United States must deter Chinese aggression in outer space. “In the not-too-distant future, they will be able to use that capability to threaten every spacecraft we have in space,” Hyten said. He opined that to prevent Chinese aggression, the U.S. be clear that we can combat it, which will lead to deterrence.[25]
Russia
The Russians officially suspended their anti-satellite program called Istrebitel Spuntnikov (Satellite Killer) at the end of the Cold War. Thirty-one years after its last anti-satellite launch, the Russians sent an inspection spacecraft into low orbit. The satellite’s tracking suggests behaviors consistent with attack craft. Oleg Ostapaneko, commander of Russia’s space forces, stated in 2010 that the country was producing inspection and strike satellites.[28]
In 2014, the Russians launched Object 2014-28E, and later that year, a spy satellite– Lunch– in violation of ITU’s spectrum licensing and geosynchronous registration. “Whatever it is, [Object 2014-28E] looks experimental,” said Patricia Lewis, research director at Chatham House and an expert in space security. “It could have a number of functions, some civilian and some military. One possibility is for some kind of grabber bar. Another would be kinetic pellets which shoot out at another satellite. Or possibly there could be a satellite-to-satellite cyber attack or jamming.”[29] The object drew U.S. attention due to its deliberate movements near rocket boosters, which is difficult to do because they can move up to 17,500 miles per hour.[30] The Russians claim that Lunch is supporting the communications operations of the International Space Station (ISS), but its purpose was not declared before launch. [31]
According to two anonymous U.S. intelligence officials, Russia successfully tested its PL-19 Nudol ASAT missile in December 2018, which marks its seventh test of the system. The ASAT flew 1,864 miles for 17 minutes and was expected to target satellites in low Earth orbit.[32] In December 2020, Russia launched a direct-ascent anti satellite missile, its third anti-satellite test of the year. Russia has now launched weapons from both the ground and space.
United States
The Chinese destruction of its weather satellite reinvigorated both the Russian and U.S. efforts to expand their satellite arsenals.[33] A few months after the Chinese ASAT test, the United States shot down a dead satellite for the first time since 1985. It launched a modified SM-3 antiballistic-missile interceptor from the Navy cruiser, Lake Erie, and shot the satellite at approximately 22,000 miles an hour. The interception prominently exhibited the United States Aegis sea based missile defense system capabilities.[34] The Pentagon stated that it was a safety precaution, but some suspect it was motivated by China’s display.[35]
In early 2015, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Congress that Russia and China were “developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict.” He specifically noted that China “has demonstrated the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites. The United States stated that it is willing to work with Russia, but the Obama administration emphasized that if attacked, the United States will defend its space assets.[36]
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) are programs developed by the U.S. to monitor the space activity of other nations, and its own satellites. One program– the Advanced Technology Risk Reduction spacecraft– launched into orbit in 2009, and is designed to sense heat plumes from rocket launches and spacecraft. It can relay tracking data to Earth and monitors approximately 1,000 satellites. In 2010, the United States launched the Space-Based Space Surveillance satellite which operates similarly to a telescope to provide an unobstructed view of objects in Earth’s orbit. Additionally, the United States utilizes approximately 30 ground radars and telescopes to observe space behavior and track other countries’ satellites. [37] There is still; however, much the United States is unable to see.
In 2010, the Air Force used its first X-37B space plane. It is launched vertically into Earth’s low orbit and returns to the surface horizontally, like a typical airplane. The most recent X-37B orbited the Earth for 718 days. The X-37B missions are shrouded in mystery. The government maintains these “mini shuttles” are not used for military purposes, and are not agile enough to manipulate enemy satellites.[38]
Seven years ago, the United States announced the existence of the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP). The Air Force has four satellites in geosynchronous orbit that are tantamount to “a neighborhood watch program for everything that goes on in that high-value orbit.”[39] The program was formerly classified, but the United States decided to publicize it so the world would know that it is prepared to address nefarious activity in GEO. In addition to these programs, the Air Force established a series of war games to test reactions to a conflict in space. The United States also has the Space Enterprise Vision, which is an integrated initiative across multiple space platforms– including communications and weather data– where satellites are equipped to defend against emerging threats.[40]
New legal frameworks must be enacted to deter the use of weapons in space. Existing treaties and legislative proposals are not designed to meet the current threat.
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) was enacted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 under resolution XXI. Article I of the treaty stipulates that, “the exploration and use of outer space… shall be carried out for the benefit and interests of all countries… and shall be the province of all mankind.” All countries are free to explore and use space without discrimination and access all areas of space and its celestial bodies.[41] Article II forbids national appropriation of outer space or other celestial bodies from claims of sovereignty “by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”[42] Article III stipulates that all activity conducted in space must be in accordance with international law and “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security.”[43] Article IV forbids nuclear weapons “or any kind of weapon of mass destruction” from entering space. The moon and other celestial bodies “shall be used by all State Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.” The testing of “any type of weapon,” the conduct of military maneuvers, and the establishment of military bases on celestial bodies is prohibited.[44]Article VII establishes liability rules for a state that launches an object that causes damage to another state.[45] The Outer Space Treaty was signed by all spacefaring nations including the United States, Russia, France, Japan, China, Great Britain, India, Israel, Iran, North Korea, South Korea and the twenty-nation cooperative European Space Agency.[46]
The OST forbids the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, but it does not clearly define “weapons of mass destruction” and does not prevent the launch of other weapons. Current customary international law classifies only nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction. This definition precludes ASATs though they could, arguably, have a greater impact on civilians than nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Since the OST does not prohibit the use of all weapons in space, the stipulation that space be used only for “peaceful purposes” is undermined. Furthermore, the OST bans the use of WMDs or the conduct of military maneuvers only on the moon and other celestial bodies; however, it does not prevent this behavior on artificial bodies in space.[47] The OST allows the legal use of ASATs in space, though the consequences could be devastating.
Two initiatives were proposed to address the concern about an arms race in space, and to address perceived weaknesses in the OST. The first is the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) which is backed by the Russians and Chinese. The second is a non-binding set of norms proposed by the EU called the International Code of Conduct. These proposals were not well received.
The PPWT
The proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space Treaty (PAROS) was on the agenda of the Conference of Disarmament (CD)– a UN body where disarmament treaties are negotiated– for several years. Its objective is to build from the Outer Space Treaty’s goal of preserving space for peaceful purposes. PAROS seeks to forbid the placement of any weapon into orbit or on any celestial body, and for parties to refrain from the threat or use of force in outer space.[48] Between 1985 and 1994, the CD established an ad hoc committee to identify issues relevant to PAROS with little success. The United States obstructed efforts to allow the committee to negotiate, and opted for bi-lateral conversations with the Soviet Union. In 1990, the United States stated, “it has not identified any particular outer space arms control measures that can be dealt with within a multilateral environment.”[49] The United States’ missile defense program, and a potential arsenal of space weapons, deterred it from further negotiations in the CD. Russia and China, conversely, pushed for parties to continue to negotiate and submitted a joint paper called Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects.[50] Elements from this working paper were used by the two countries to write a draft for a weapons ban in space.
On February 12, 2008, Russia and China brought a draft treaty entitled the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to the UN Conference on Disarmament. The treaty forbids “hostile action against outer space objects including, inter alia, those aimed at their destruction, damage, temporarily or permanently injuring normal functioning, deliberate alteration of the parameters of their orbit, or the threat of these actions.”[51] The United States views the Russian and Chinese commitment to the treaty as disingenuous. Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the think-tank Stimson Center, stated “the draft treaty from Russia and China seeks to ban the very things that they are so actively pursuing.”[52]
Deficiencies of the PPWT
The treaty calls for a ban on weapons in space, which is unrealistic because the United States is unwilling to restrict its space asset capabilities, and it will be difficult to detect if a space object is a weapon because of dual use technology. Furthermore, there is no verifiable system to determine if countries violate the terms of the agreement. “It is possible that countries could devise software-only modifications to convert ballistic missile defense systems to ASAT weapons, enabling a sudden breakout capability from a ban on ASAT possession that would be impossible to detect under any realistic verification regime.”[53] Additionally, anti-satellite weapons are entirely absent from the treaty and it fails to discuss ground based weapons that can target outer space assets. The definition of “weapons” continually evolves as new technologies emerge that can cause damage tantamount to conventional weapons. A ban on “weapons” in space is insufficient.
International Code of Conduct
The EU published a draft of a voluntary set of norms to govern space behavior called the International Code of Conduct. The draft was revised in 2008, 2010 and 2014. In 2015, 109 countries gathered at UN headquarters in New York to refine the agreement. The Russian and Chinese; however, rejected the code.[54] The norms seek to preserve the integrity of objects in orbit and recognizes a state’s right to respond in self-defense. Signatories agree “to establish and implement policies and procedures to minimize the risk of accidents in space, collisions between space objects, or any form of harmful interference with another State’s peaceful exploration, and use, of outer space” … and to “refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of space objects unless such action is justified.” [55]
Deficiencies of the International Code of Conduct
The code is perceived by many to be “dead,” in part because the United States announced in January 2012 that it would not support the draft. Since the United States has the most developed space presence, its cooperation is necessary for any regulatory system to operate successfully. The Obama administration expressed concern that it might restrict U.S. military defense capabilities. When asked about the code, Lieutenant Colonel April Cunningham– a spokesperson for the United States Department of Defense– stated, “Modern armed forces increasingly rely on space and the US must ensure that operations in other domains – land, sea, air – can be effectively enabled by space.”[56]Additionally, the United States wanted emerging space faring countries to be party to the drafting– notably India and Brazil– who were excluded. In many areas, the code did not advance any meaningful change to the status quo.[57]Lastly, since the code is not legally binding, it may not adequately deter weaponization programs.
To resolve problems embedded in current proposals, the United States should lead an effort to draft a new treaty to regulate weapons in space.
A new legally binding treaty to regulate space weaponization should address consequences of states behaviors, rather than the tools used to implement attacks. The treaty should not define “weapons” because it will unnecessarily limit what can be regulated. The treaty will seek the consultation of states that were not party to the initial drafting of the European Code. The two primary objectives of the treaty will be to (1) reduce the proliferation of space debris and (2) create a test ban on debris producing weapons.
Space Debris
Space debris is the collection of obsolete man-made objects in space– such as old satellites, or fragments caused by erosion or collisions. Space debris is incredibly dangerous because objects in space move at such high speeds that even a fleck of debris can disable a satellite. Space debris has created clutter over time, which makes it difficult to navigate space. Approximately 70-90 launches occur annually, where 30 or more small satellites are put in orbit. Currently, between four and five satellites break-up each year, which will result in a steady increase of space objects and the likelihood that collisions will occur.[58] To keep space operational, space debris must be reduced.
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is a group of space agencies– including NASA, the Russian Federal Space Agency and the Chinese National Space Administration. In 2002, the IADC released recommendations to mitigate space debris that included “intentional destruction of a space system (self-destruction, intentional collision, etc.), and other harmful activities that may significantly increase collision risks to other systems should be avoided. For instance, intentional break-ups should be conducted at sufficiently low altitudes so that orbital fragments are short lived.”[60]
The United States has also led efforts to reduce space debris by implementing mandatory regulations. In 1995, NASA created guidelines to curtail space debris, and later established the Orbital Debris Mitigation Practices. Under the Bush administration, these guidelines became part of NASA’s Procedural Requirement 8715.6A. In 2010, the Obama administration incorporated the practices at the Department of Defense.[59]
The new treaty will emphasize that the effects of a satellite attack can be devastating in the short and long run due to the creation of space debris. The treaty should formalize space debris regulations because it benefits the entire international community; cooperation in this area already exists; and it further incentivizes nations not to use ASAT weapons. The language will be unable to fully prohibit the intentional destruction of satellites because there will be occasions when it is necessary, such as if a rogue satellite heads towards a valuable asset. The treaty should; however, prohibit unprovoked satellite attacks. (Of course there will be debate over what defines “provocation,” but judicial review would cease to exist if law was black and white).
A Test Ban on Debris Producing Weapons
The treaty should ban the testing of debris generating weapons, which would effectively prohibit weapons testing that cause kinetic explosions. This treaty would not define ASATs or include a ban of weapons tests that do not generate debris. Verification efforts under a test ban are more plausible than the Russian and Chinese proposal. The United States has an “unmatched ability to track launches, satellites, and debris.”[61] The ban would not monitor if a nation stockpiled ASATs, or if they were placed in orbit without being tested. These acts alone are non-destructive and would not be regulated by the treaty.
Opponents note that a complete ban would create an advantage for the United States, Russia and China unless additional nations are able to test and develop their ASAT capabilities before treaty ratification.[62] The (perceived) advantage provided to Russia and China; however, will incentivize them to ratify it. Their cooperation is important because their space activity is of most concern to the United States.
The United States should also prioritize negotiations with new and non-spacefaring nations. To combat the belief of a disadvantage for the failure to possess ASAT capabilities, the United States should change the narrative regarding the technology, similar to the nuclear test ban. The proposed treaty is comparable to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 because it does not allow new countries to establish nuclear capabilities.[63] Although some (rogue) nations still attempt to develop nuclear weapons, many members of the international community view their use with such repugnancy that they do not pursue development. The United States must clearly state the global devastation these weapons will cause, instead of demonstrating power in their possession. The United States will foster support for the treaty from new and non-spacefaring nations, not because of their inability to develop ASAT capabilities, but despite it.
The treaty will not eliminate the weaponization of space– the international community recognizes that weapons are likely already in orbit. This treaty will also not attempt to clarify ambiguities in the OST regarding weapons and whether they can be placed on artificial bodies. It will be an arms control treaty embedded in an environmental treaty, which will improve the likelihood of wide ratification. Space debris affects the entire international community and its proliferation will render space inoperable. Furthermore, if we stop ASAT testing and prohibit the use of space debris producing weapons, it will sufficiently regulate space weaponization.
The preamble to the proposed treaty follows.
Proposed Treaty Preamble
The State Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as “the State Parties”),
Inspired by the scientific achievements that have enabled mankind’s continued exploration of outer space;
Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space is for peaceful purposes;
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which was ratified by one-hundred and five countries including the United States, Russia and China;
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the preservation of outer space for future generations of both space faring and non-space faring nations;
Convinced that the proliferation of space debris will render space unnavigable;
Desiring to stop the intentional destruction of space assets and other harmful activities that create space debris;
Further desiring to ban the test of all space debris producing weapons;
Urging the cooperation of all states in this objective;
Believing that this treaty will promote the security of all states and foster mutual trust through international cooperation;
Have agreed to the following:
Increased dependence on technology leaves global populations vulnerable to unconventional methods of attack. Though an attack on satellites may not produce the same degree of carnage found in a nuclear arms race, disabled satellites can devastate a population with consequences that ripple outside national borders. It is imperative that the United States helps create international protocols to prevent a conflict in space. For the United States to embolden a regulatory system without compromising its spaces assets, it must lead the drafting of a new proposal.
In the thirteen years since the historic Wimbledon match, the tennis landscape has changed as new competitors developed. Rafael Nadal and Roger Federer; however, still competed against each other in the most recent Grand Slam final in Australia in January. This time, Federer won. (This was true when first written in 2017, and I refuse to modify it because I love living in past glory). Despite the rise of new opponents, these two athletes have continued to thrive partially because they play each other so often that it forces them to adapt and improve. Since the 2008 Wimbledon final, their priorities have expanded as they recognize that Grand Slam glory is not the only barometer of success. Both men work to develop future tennis players, with Nadal opening the Rafael Nadal Tennis Academy in Mallorca, Spain in 2016. Federer was invited to attend the opening of the school and stated, “there was always mutual respect between Rafa and [me], regardless of the logical pressure to achieve our respective goals.” He continued by addressing Nadal, “because you’re left-handed, because of your spin, because of the intensity you bring to the court, I had to re-invent and re-work my game entirely. And that’s because of the person you are and how much you’ve trained.” In the future, Federer and Nadal can compete over who will produce the next tennis prodigy that innovates the game by learning from their experiences. They seek to improve the future of the sport, even if they will not personally reap the rewards.
World powers can continue to compete against each other, but it behooves the international community if their goal is not individual military superiority, but the improvement and preservation of the global commons. The Russians, Chinese and Europeans have proposed regulations to space weapons that failed to gain international support. The United States should challenge itself, and them, to prove strength through diplomacy and not weapons proliferation. Like Nadal and Federer, we can be competitors and work together for a greater good. Instead of pushing each other towards destruction with conventional ideologies of power, we should push each other to innovate by changing the narrative. The race to control space should be the race to regulate it. Who can produce sustained security in outer space to benefit future generations first? Competition breeds innovation.
BS
[1]Matthew J. Kleiman, Space Law 101: An Introduction to Space Law, American Bar Association,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/
the_101_201_practice_series/space_law_101_an_introduction_to_space_law.html.
[2]Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen, Space Law a Treatise, 2009.
[3]Ambassador (Ret) Paul Meyer, The Conference on Disarmament and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, April 2011 http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-conference-on-disarmament-and-the-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-370.pdf.
[4]Harsh Vasani, How China is Weaponizing Outer Space, The Diplomat, January 19, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/.
[5]Sam Seitz, Dynamics of Space Weaponization and the ASAT Threat, Global Intelligence Trust, July 13, 2016, http://www.globalintelligencetrust.com/single-post/2016/07/13/Dynamics-of-Space-Weaponization-and-the-ASAT-Threat.
[6]Id.
[7]Lyall & Larsen at 199.
[8]Id at 389.
[9]Cheryl Pellerin, Hyten: Deterrence in Space Means No War Will be Fought There, DoD News, January 26, 2017 https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1061833/hyten-deterrence-in-space-means-no-war-will-be-fought-there.
[10]http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/whatwedo.aspx
[11]David Axe, When it Comes to War in Space, U.S. has Edge, Reuters, August 10, 2015 http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/.
[12]UCS Satellite Database, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.
[13]See Billings.
[14]See Vasani.
[15]See Billings.
[16]Jane C. Hu, Russia, China, and the United States are developing “dual use” technologies. One use is peaceful. The other isn’t., Slate, December 23, 2014
[17]See Axe.
[18]See Hu.
[19]See Vasani.
[20]See Vasani.
[21]Id.
[22]Michael Listner, The Continued Debate About Anti-Satellite Weapons, Nine Years After China’s Test, SpaceNews, February 19, 2016, http://spacenews.com/op-ed-the-continued-debate-about-anti-satellite-weapons-nine-years-after-chinas-test/.
[23]Jim Sciutto and Jennifer Rizzo, War in Space: Kamikazes, Kidnapper Satellites and Lasers, CNN, November 29, 2016 http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/29/politics/space-war-lasers-satellites-russia-china/.
[24]Sam Jones, Object 2014-28E- Space Junk or Russian Satellite Killer?, Financial Times, November 17, 2014. https://www.ft.com/content/cdd0bdb6-6c27-11e4-990f-00144feabdc0.
[25]Cheryl Pellerin, Hyten: Deterrence
in Space Means No War Will be Fought There, DoD News, January 26, 2017 https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1061833/hyten-deterrence-in-space-means-no-war-will-be-fought-there.
[26]Id.
[27]See Jones.
[28]See Jones.
[29]Id.
[30]See Sciutto & Rizzo
[31]Id.
[32]Marcias, Amanda & Sheetz, Michael, Russia Conducted Another Successful Test… , CNBC, January 18, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/russia-succeeds-in-mobile-anti-satellite-missile-test-us-intelligence-report.html.
[33]SeeAxe.
[34]Laura Grego, The Anti-Satellite Capability of the Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System, Federation of American Scientists, Winter 2011, https://fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Anti-Satellite.pdf.
[35]See Axe.
[36]See Billings.
[37]See Axe.
[38]Mike Wall, Air Force’s Mysterious X-37B Space Plane Breaks Orbital Record, Space.com, March 25, 2016, http://www.space.com/36205-x-37b-space-plane-breaks-record.html.
[39]See Pellerin.
[40]Id.
[41]Outer Space Treaty, Art. I http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html.
[42] Id at Art. II.
[43]Id at Art. III.
[44]Id at Art. IV.
[45]Id at Art. VII.
[46]Which Countries Were First to Launch Satellites?, Space Today Online,
[47]David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons,30 Michigan Journal of International Law, 1187-1272 (Summer 2009), p. 1198.
[48]Proposed Prevention on an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/.
[49]UN General Assembly Press Release, GA/DIS/ 3310, October 25, 2005, https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gadis3310.doc.ht.
[50]Conference on Disarmament, CD/ 1679, October 28, 2002, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/
Resources/Factsheets/paros/CD1679.pdf.
[51]Article 1 § E of the PPWT.
[52]See Billings.
[53]Ross LIemer and Christopher F. Chyba, A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons, The Washington Quarterly, July 2010, p. 153.
[54]European Union External Action Space Conduct Code, March 31, 2014, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf.
[55]Id.
[56]Jessica Wingard, The Battle for Cooperation in Space Begins, Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2012, http://www.dw.com/en/the-battle-for-cooperation-in-space-begins/a-16015140.
[57]Id.
[58]European Space Agency, Mitigating Space Debris Generation, April 17, 2017, http://www.iadc-online.org/References/Docu/Space_Debris_Mitigation_Guidelines_COPUOS.pdf.
[59]Michael J. Listner, The International Code of Conduct: Comments on Changes in the Latest Draft and Post-Mortem Thoughts, October 26, 2015, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2851/1.
[60]IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Revision 1, September 2007, http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-2002-01,%20IADC%20Space%20Debris%20Guidelines,%20Revision%201.pdf.
[61]SeeLIemer & Chyba at 154.
[62]Id.
[63]Id at 158.
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